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B ECAUSE of the nature of condemnation proceedings, existing
economic conditions, and the fact that a total taking involves
comparatively few legal complications, it is probably true that the ma-
jority of litigated cases in the field of eminent domain which reach
the appellate courts involve only a partial taking of the property of
the owner.
When a partial taking occurs, the basic problem presented by the
Texas constitutional provision against the taking of private property
without compensation,' and the applicable legislative enactments," is
the necessity for recompensing the owner, who has lost a part of his
property and often has been damaged with respect to the part not
taken.
I. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
For a long time the problem of compensation for the portion of a
man's premises taken and for damages otherwise sustained produced
uncertainty in the Texas courts. The Texas statute delineating the
procedure for the conduct of condemnation proceedings,3 while
couched generally in language appropriate to an initial proceeding by
commissioners appointed by the county judge, is nevertheless appli-
cable to a trial in the county court on appeal, and sets out the com-
pensatory standards which must prevail.' It provides generally for
payment for the portion taken and compensation for damages to the
remainder in the following language:
The commissioners shall hear evidence as to the value of the property
sought to be condemned and as to the damages which will be sustained
by the owner, if any, by reason of such condemnation and as to the
benefits that will result to the remainder of such property belonging to
such owner, if any, by reason of the condemnation of the property,
and its employment for the purpose for which it is to be condemned,
t From a paper presented at the Southwestern Legal Foundation Institute on Eminent Do-
main (1958). Published with the permission of Matthew Bender & Company, publisher.
* B.A., University of Texas; LL.B., Harvard University; Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
'Tex. Const. art. I, 5 17.
:Basically, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 3264-3271 (1952).
STex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3265 (1952).
'Perry v. Wichita Falls, R. & F. W. R. Co., 238 S.W. 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
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and according to this rule shall assess the actual damages that will ac-
crue to the owner by such condemnation.'
When only a portion of a tract or parcel of a person's real estate is con-
demned, the commissioners shall estimate the injuries sustained and the
benefits received thereby by the owner; whether the remaining portion
is increased or diminished in value by reason of such condemnation, and
the extent of such increase or diminution and shall assess the damages
accordingly.!
Damages and benefits sustained by the community generally are both
eliminated by section 4, which reads as follows:
In estimating either the injuries or benefits, as provided in the proceed-
ing article, such injuries or benefits which the owner sustains or receives
in common with the community generally and which are not peculiar
to him and connected with his ownership, use and enjoyment, of the par-
ticular parcel of land, shall not be considered by the commissioners in
making their estimate."
II. VALUATION OF PART TAKEN
The question of valuation of the part taken is pursued in general on
the same "willing seller-willing buyer" basis applicable in a total tak-
ing.' All justifiable approaches to value are employed and thus any-
thing bearing on value is admissible in evidence; however, the funda-
mental issue is, as indicated, the question of value and not the worth
or effect of its component elements.9 But the part taken must be val-
ued without reference to the use which the condemnor will make of
the premises."0 Otherwise, the appraisal of the land would be influ-
enced by the eminent domain proceeding, since consideration would
be given to the value of the land to the condemnor or to its increased
worth because of the contemplated improvement in the area. This is
not the type of compensation to which he is entitled. Nor can the
owner enhance the valuation of the part taken by pointing to the gen-
eral designation of the area as the site for the project in advance of
the filing of the condemnation action."
5Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 3265, § 1 (1952).
OId. § 3.
7Id. § 4.
'City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 153 Tex. 324, 267 S.W.2d 808 (1954). See the definition
of market value on p. 415 infra.
'Sample v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 151 Tex. 401, 251 S.W.2d 221 (1952).
" City of El Paso v. Cofn, 88 S.W. 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) error dism.; Too Fan v.
City of El Paso, 214 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
n But if the public improvement has already been established, and the condemnation
comes at a second stage, the improvement may be considered. City of Dallas v. Shackelford,
200 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref. n.r.e., approved (prior to denying motion




The initial question, i.e., that of valuing the part taken, does not at
first blush seem too troublesome. The difficulty becomes apparent,
however, when it is realized that often different answers are produced
if the severed land is valued as a separate, distinct tract, and if it is
valued as a part of the larger tract out of which it has been carved.
If a farmer owns a rectangular 160 acre tract, all in cultivation, and
with a public road along its south side, there would probably be little
difference in valuing the east one-half of this tract, as eighty acres
considered as an isolated tract, and valuing it as equal to one-half of
the value of the 160 acres. However, quite frequently public improve-
ments, particularly roads and highways, must of necessity be con-
structed without regard to the size, shape or characteristics of the par-
ticular tracts on or through which the public improvement is placed.
Thus, in the above hypothetical, if a highway were to run across the
northwest corner of the 160 acre tract, cutting off eight acres, differ-
ing methods of valuation might well produce differing results. Assum-
ing that the 160 acre tract is worth $100.00 per acre as a tract, valu-
ing the eight acres as a part thereof would produce a value of $800.00.
On the other hand, to value the eight acres as severed land would not
only require consideration of the particular physical characteristics of
this eight acre tract," but also, when it is considered as severed land,
it must be viewed as a tract too small for economic farming and as
completely isolated from any public road or other means of access.
Its value under such an appraisal shrinks significantly. The latter ap-
proach thus seems rather harsh to the landowner. It is not surprising,
therefore, that several early cases concluded that in valuing the tract
actually taken, it should be considered as a portion of the larger tract.
A. Framing The Special Issues: State v. Carpenter
In a number of cases prior to 1936 the courts, in an effort to be fair
to the landowner, required that the value of the strip taken be con-
sidered in the light of the value of the tract of which it constituted a
part. Thus, in Routh v. Texas Traction Company,"' the jury was in-
structed that in determining the value of the strip taken for a right-
of-way, it should not determine the value of the strip by itself but as
a part of the tract of land owned by the condemnees of which it
formed a part. The jury was required to determine the value per acre
of the entire tract and then to compute the value of the strip taken
in proportion to its acreage.
1 For example, whether it is rocky, or contains a creek, etc.
' 148 S.W. 1152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
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Similarly, in Pillot v. City of Houston,' the jury was required to
fix the value of the strip as a proportionate part of the value of the
entire tract of which the strip constituted a part.
The courts taking this approach in valuing the severed tract did
not realize, however, that, in considering the loss the owner would
sustain in severing and isolating the land taken, they were in effect
anticipating and encroaching upon the second aspect of the com-
pensation problem, that relating to the damages to the remainder
of the land (i.e., the part not taken). This aspect under the Texas
statute" must be separately considered.
The celebrated case of State v. Carpenter6 laid the erroneous ap-
proach to rest in an opinion of the commission of appeals by Com-
missioner German, supplemented by an opinion rendered in over-
ruling the landowner's motion for rehearing. In the Carpenter case,
eight acres had been taken out of a larger tract. The trial court
had permitted the jury to ascribe to the eight acres a corresponding
proportion of the value of the entire tract and the court of civil
appeals had affirmed this action." Pointing out that this paved the
way for double damages by allowing the court to consider the effect
of severance first in valuing the strip taken and again in assessing
damages to the remainder of the tract, the commission set out three
special issues which have since been used in thousands of Texas cases
for the submission of a partial taking condemnation suit to a jury.
In the language of the Carpenter case, which involved a highway
condemnation, first the jury is asked:
From a preponderance of the evidence what do you find was the market
value of the strip of land condemned by the state for highway purposes
at the time it was condemned, considered as severed land?
You are instructed that the term market value is the price the property
will bring when offered for sale by one who desires to sell, but is not ob-
liged to sell, and is bought by one who desires to buy, but is under no
necessity of buying. 8
Then to resolve the question as to consequential damages to the re-
mainder of the land the jury is asked:
From a preponderance of the evidence what do you find was the mar-
ket value of defendants' tract of land, exclusive of the strip of land
condemned, immediately before the strip was taken for highway pur-
poses?
19
14 51 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3265, S 3 (1952).
1689 S.W.2d 194, on rehearing, 89 S.W.2d 979 (Tex. Comm. App. 1936).
'7 55 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
" 89 S.W.2d at 201, 980.
19 Id. at 201.
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and then this question:
Excluding increase in value, if any, and decrease in value, if any, by
reason of benefits or injuries received by defendants in common with
the community generally and not peculiar to them and connected with
their ownership, use, and enjoyment of the particular tract of land
across which the strip of land has been condemned, and taking into
consideration the uses to which the strip condemned is to be subjected,
what do you find from a preponderance of the evidence was the mar-
ket value of the remainder of defendants' tract of land immediately
after the taking of the strip condemned for highway purposes?2
Subtracting the value of the remainder after the taking from
the value of the remainder before the taking gives the damages to
which the owner is entitled, in addition, of course, to the value of
the strip taken."'
The landowner in his motion for rehearing in the Carpenter case
asserted the practical argument previously mentioned, viz., that
while eight typical acres of a 160 acre tract worth $100.00 per acre
would generally be considered to be worth $800.00, nevertheless, if
the question be considered one as to the value of a tract of severed
land, too small to farm and cut off from access to public roads, the
eight acres might well be considered to be worth only $100.00. Com-
missioner German squarely met this contention by responding that
under these circumstances, $700.00 difference in value would be sal-
vaged by the landowner in the answers to the issues on damage to the
remainder."'
Exactly how the language of the two issues provides for the re-
covery of this difference does not clearly appear. The second issue
might well be interpreted as inquiring as to the value of the re-
maining tract of land before the taking, exclusive of the strip con-
demned and considered unto itself. From this viewpoint, pursuing
the example given above, the remaining 152 acres of the 160 acre
tract were worth $15,200.00 before the taking. Since they were not
damaged by the severance of the eight acres in the northwest corner,
it would seem that (eliminating any question of benefits or damages
through the nature of the improvement) they would still be worth
$15,200 after the taking, in answer to the third question, thus pro-
ducing a net finding of no damage. This result can be avoided by
treating the second question as ascribing to the remaining tract the
value of the total tract before the taking, less the value of the strip
20 Id. at 201-02.
"Wallace v. Van Zandt County, 264 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
22 89 S.W.2d at 981.
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condemned as found in answer to the first question. Since the second
issue contains no instruction to the effect that the remaining tract
shall be considered as severed land, the latter interpretation is pro-
bably the proper one. In any event, it seems that no real harm has
resulted to the land owners by this type of submission because juries
probably follow a common sense approach in answering issues.
Moreover, the form of submission laid down by the Carpenter case
has met the test of time; this case has come to be regarded by both
the supreme court and the bar as the landmark case in its field."5
B. Effect On Issues Where Condemnor Takes Less Than
Fee Simple Title
While many partial takings represent the acquisition of a fee
simple title by the condemnor in the strip or area in question, a
great many condemnations are by agencies, usually private corpora-
tions, which possess the power of eminent domain but cannot ac-
quire a fee simple title. These agencies must take an easement or
rights which, while perhaps very extensive, nevertheless terminate
when the use ceases and therefore are less than a fee."4
Cases where less than a fee is taken require an alteration in the jury
issue submission; four issues are submitted rather than three as in
the Carpenter case. The last two questions (damages as to remainder)
are substantially the same, but in lieu of the first question inquiring
simply as to the value of the tract taken two inquiries must be sub-
mitted. The following illustrate:
What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence was the reason-
able market value of the strip of land covered by the easement involved
herein, immediately prior to the taking of said easement?
What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence was the reason-
able market value of the strip of land covered by the easement involved
herein, immediately after the taking of said easement?2
The difference in the figures supplied in the answers to these two
questions establishes the value of the interest in land actually taken.
Less-than-a-fee-taking has produced a subsidiary problem, viz.,
whether there must always remain something of value to the land-
23 See City of Austin v. Cannizzo, supra note 8.
4 See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3270 (1952). Some types of corporations have special
statutes applicable to them. See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6339 (1926) regarding
railroads.
2s These issues were adapted from those submitted in Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Hunt, 222
S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), aff'd 149 Tex. 33, 228 S.W.2d 151 (1950). For ex-
amples of the use of four issues, see Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Dishman, 303 S.W.2d
471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) and Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 278 S.W.2d 410
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
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owner in the strip after the condemnation. In a 1950 case, Texas
Pipeline Company v. Hunt,' the supreme court said that when the
condemnor took less than a fee, the taking could only entail com-
pensation for less than the value of a fee, and therefore a finding by
a jury of a post-condemnation value of zero could not stand, despite
expert testimony that the strip had no value. However, two years
later in Thompson v. Janes," the court pointed out that the rule of
the Hunt case was applicable only where the owner had some bene-
ficial use left in the land, e.g., where a pipeline or power line crossed
under or over his pasture. Where a so-called easement deprived the
owner of any and all real beneficial use of the land (e.g., where the
taking was for a railroad depot"8 ) the landowner might recover as
damages the market value of the land before the taking through
a permitted jury finding to the effect that the market value of the
land after the taking, burdened by the easement, had no value.
The recent case of Mitchell v. Texas Electric Service Company,"
which dealt with a power line easement, held, in following the Hunt
case, that since there was value left to the landowner in some type
of beneficial use, the compensation which the condemnor must pay
for the strip taken should be something less than the value of the
full fee. The court, following the trial technique used in the Hunt
case, required a remittitur which, to avoid any possibility of injury
to the condemnor, was measured by the difference between the value
before the taking and the largest amount assigned by any witness
for the condemnor to the value of the strip after the taking." In the
even later case of City of Houston v. Collins," the court of civil
appeals at Houston announced that the rule was "well settled" to
the effect that if the taking of an easement deprives the owner of
the beneficial use of his property, he is entitled to a recovery of the
market value of the fee. Thus, the law is now settled on a practical
and common sense basis rather than upon nice distinctions in the
law of real property. If the property is in effect lost to the owner,
he receives compensation in full.
C. Benefit To Owner Is Not Considered In Valuing Land Taken
The law is clear in Texas that, in valuing the land taken, benefits to
28149 Tex. 33, 228 S.W.2d 151 (1950).
27151 Tex. 495, 251 S.W.2d 953 (1952).
"8 The taking in the Hunt case was for precisely this purpose.
29299 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
"°Texas Electric Service Co. v. Vest, 310 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref.
n.r.e. follows Hunt also, in rejecting a finding of no value after the taking of an easement
but the court felt itself unable to cure the error by remittitur in the state of the record.
"' 310 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
[Vol. 13
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the land owner are not considered." He is entitled to be compensated
for his land in money, not in benefits, no matter how real they may
appear to be.
In trying and submitting cases involving limited takings, the court
is guided by the rights sought by the condemnor, which may be as
varied as the necessities of the situation require. Condemnation pro-
ceedings may be instituted for the purpose of, e.g., securing the right
to keep an area clear33 or disposing of water." The nature of the right
sought to be condemned determines the damages payable. If, for ex-
ample, the state condemns the right of access to a highway, compensa-
tion therefore must be paid," although, under different circumstances,
such a right could be lost or destroyed through an appropriate exer-
cise of the police power, without compensation.
III. DAMAGES To THE REMAINDER
Only if there has been a partial taking does the question arise in a
condemnation suit as to damages to property not taken. Obviously, if
there is a total taking, there is no property remaining to be damaged,
and if there is no actual taking of a portion of a man's property the
filing of condemnation proceedings is not necessary and there is no
condemnation suit in which to litigate the question of damages.
Under constitutions of this state in effect prior to its present con-
stitution (which was adopted in 1876), there was no provision for
liability for damage done to property by a public agency as distin-
guished from a taking of the property, and there was no provision un-
der which compensation was payable prior to the taking. Under arti-
cle I, section 17 of our present constitution, "No person's property
shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use with-
out adequate compensation being made.. . ,, However, if the injury
is confined to a damaging, and no taking is involved, no advance pay-
ment of compensation is required, and the owner is relegated to a suit
for damages." Hence, an important practical point revolves around
whether there is an actual taking of any portion of the landowner's
property. If there is a taking of a portion, no matter how small, pay-
ment is made for the part taken in the condemnation proceeding and
" Dulaney v. Nolan County, 85 Tex. 225, 20 S.W. 70 (1892); Travis County v. Trog-
den, 88 Tex. 302, 31 S.W. 358 (1895).
" Texas Electric Service Co. v. Perkins, 23 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
' Schlottman v. Wharton County, 259 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error dism.
"State v. Meyers, 292 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
36 City of San Antonio v. Pigeonhole Parking of Texas, - Tex. -, 311 S.W.2d 218, 12
Sw.L.J. 522 (1958).
"Tex. Const. art. I, S 17.
" Duvall v. City of Dallas, 27 S.W.2d 1105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref.
1959]
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in the same action damages are allowed for the injury suffered by the
remainder."9 If, on the other hand, there is no taking, no condemna-
tion action is necessary and the initiative is upon the landowner to
bring suit for his damages." The practical result, no doubt, is that
frequently damages are sustained by landowners in the course of the
construction of a public improvement, but no compensation for dam-
ages is received because no taking was involved, and the matter was
not thrust, so to speak, upon the attention of the landowner by the
institution of condemnation proceedings.
A. Common Injuries Or Benefits Not Compensable
In compliance with section 4 of article 3265, which accords with
general concepts of fairness, the jury, in determining damages through
appraising the value of the remainder of the land after the taking,
is required to eliminate from consideration benefits or injuries com-
mon to the community generally." There are, however, two aspects
of post-condemnation value that the jury is reminded to consider in
accordance with the statutory injunction.
The first requirement is that they consider any damages sustained
by this particular land, and any benefits accruing to it, which are pe-
culiar to it and not shared by the community in general. Note that
this permits benefits to offset damages, but, as stated above, the law
does not allow benefits to be charged against the landowner as to the
part taken in the unusual case where there are no damages sustained
by the remainder of the tract."
There is no exact definition of what constitutes common injuries
and benefits or, conversely, what constitutes special injuries and bene-
fits to the remaining land. The general presence in the neighborhood
of an improvement (e.g., a depot) would appear to be a com-
mon benefit (or injury)." The closing of a street two blocks away
has been held to be only a common injury." To constitute a benefit
to the specific land, the circumstances should largely affect that parti-
cular tract only, e.g., by supplying fencing,"' or new and theretofore
unsupplied access." The furnishing of electricity to a particular tract
"' Wallace v. Van Zandt County, supra note 21.
40 See note 38, supra.
4Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3265, S 4 (1952).
41 See cases cited note 32 supra. Thus, if no damages have been claimed by the landowner,
evidence as to benefits is not admissible. Hughes v. State, 302 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App.
1957) error ref. n.r.e.
41 International & G.N.R. Co. v. Bell, 130 S.W. 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) error ref.
"'City of Dallas v. Hallum, 285 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
41 Isenberg v. Gulf, T. & W. Ry., 152 S.W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
"o Currie v. Glasscock County, 212 S.W. 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919). There is probably
no benefit if land is already served by a road. Cook v. Eastland County, 260 S.W. 881 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924); Anderson v. Wharton County, 65 S.W. 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
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has been held to be a special benefit."' Generally speaking, it may be
stated that whether particular items of benefit or damage are com-
mon (and therefore not to be considered) or special (and therefore to
be taken into consideration) is a question for jury determination.
The second requirement, which is associated with the first, obli-
gates the jury to consider the use to which the condemnor will put the
tract taken. It is this use which determines in part whether there will
be damages sustained or benefits realized. Note that this future use
by condemnor may be considered only in determining the damage
issues; it may not be considered in answering the question as to the
value of the strip taken." (There the issue is as to what the strip or
area was worth immediately before the taking without regard to the
use to which the condemnor will put it or the overall improvement
planned by the condemning authority.) Note also that if, because of
benefits received, the value of the remainder after taking is higher
than its value before, there will be no net damage to the remainder.
Further, the landowner's recovery for the part taken (discussed in the
Carpenter case) will be offset to the extent of any such excess.
Many items of damage other than the impact of the condemnor's
special contemplated use on the landowner's remaining property, how-
ever, are considered in determining the post-condemnation value of
the remainder. In this category falls the compensation, e.g., for the
loss of improvements that have gone with the severed land, for opera-
tional problems in connection with moving livestock, changing farm-
ing technique, or coping with water flow, and for many similar items.
These items are not recovered in terms of their own value, of course,
but they are reflected in the lower valuation of the remaining land
after the taking. Thus, if new barns or fences are required to serve
the remaining tract, this fact is reflected in the form of a reduced
value for the remaining land and is translated into damages in the
subtracting process, when post-condemnation value is taken from pre-
condemnation value of the remainder to reach the figure the land-
owner is entitled to receive as damages."
Our supreme court has said that any element of damages is rele-
vant and material in resolving the ultimate issue, viz., the net amount
of damages as reflected by the difference in the value of the remain-
der "before" and "after" the taking."
'Arcola Sugar Mills v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 153 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m.; Aycock v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 175 S.W.2d 710
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m.
48 See note 10, supra.




Since the damages are ascertained through valuing the remainder
of the tract, both before and after the taking, the inquiry arises as to
whether improvements and land uses planned by either the con-
demnor or the landowner may be considered. It is settled that in valu-
ing the remainder after taking the proposed use of the land taken
by the condemnor may be considered;"M and if there are reasonable
prospects that the remainder of the landowner's tract will be devoted
to a particular use (e.g., commercial development), it may be valued
for that purpose. This is true even though zoning ordinances cur-
rently forbid such use, for courts recognize that such prohibitions
change." The rule of reason prevails, but with a note of moderation.
While the landowner's remaining raw land may be valued upon the
basis of commercial potentiality, if it is still unimproved, prices paid
in recent sales of improved lots are not admissible. Furthermore, opin-
ion testimony as to the front-foot value of non-existent lots in a hy-
pothetical subdivision is too speculative as direct evidence," although
it can come in "through the back door," so to speak, as a part of the
basis for the expert's valuation of the tract as a whole.
B. Condemnor's Post- Or Pre-Condemnation Acts As Compensable
In Condemnation Action
While, as stated, the use to which the condemnor will put the land
is clearly relevant, considerable uncertainty has existed regarding the
extent to which acts detrimental to the landowner and performed by
the condemnor either prior to the taking or thereafter may be shown
in the condemnation proceedings. A number of decisions have enun-
ciated the rule that acts committed prior to institution of condemna-
tion proceedings are trespasses for which recovery must be sought in
a separate action;" similarly, others have held that damages arising out
of negligent construction of the public work, after the taking, are
not recoverable in the condemnation suit." However, the Supreme
Court of Texas in the recent decision of Glade v. Dietert"' ruled that,
where the trespass consisted of the destruction of shade trees in ad-
vance of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, there should be
" Gulf Coast Irr. Co. v. Gary, 118 Tex. 469, 14 S.W.2d 266 (1929); Texas Power &
Light Co. v. Snell, 15 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
"State v. Thompson, 290 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
'3 City of Austin v. Cannizzo, supra, note 8.
"4Minyard v. Texas Power & Light Co., 271 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error
ref. n.r.e.
"Stakes v. Houston North Shore Ry., 32 S.W.2d 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), and
cases there cited.
" Ft. Worth & D.S.P. Ry. v. Gilmore, 2 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Jefferson
County Traction Co. v. Wilhelm, 194 S.W. 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
57 156 Tex. 382, 295 S.W.2d 642 (1956).
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but one recovery, and that one in the condemnation action. Thus, at
least where the priar trespass may be brought within the scope of
traditional condemnation damage issues, there will be, and need be,
only one suit; the question as to value before the taking will relate
back to a date prior to the trespass, so as to encompass the loss caused
by the trespass in the damage formula. A recent decision of the Fort
Worth Court of Civil Appeals in Gulf, C. &€ S. F. Ry. v. Payne," ex-
tended the applicable damage period in the opposite direction and
permitted a showing by the landowner as to the dust, noise, and dis-
turbance arising during the actual construction work-conditions
which presumably would not continue after the railroad track and
structure had been completed and trains had begun to operate-as
bearing upon the value of the remaining land after condemnation. In
this fashion recovery was in effect allowed in the condemnation action
for damages sustained by the landowner through acts of the con-
demnor after the taking.
C. Determination Of "The Remainder Of Such Property"
The statute speaks of damages "which will be sustained by the own-
er ... and the benefits that will result to the remainder of such prop-
erty belonging to such owner,""s and the special issues are phrased in
terms of the defendant's tract of land. What is the area to which
these words refer? How much of defendant's land may be considered
damaged and where must it lie to be eligible for consideration? Of
course the facts must govern"--one type of taking may inflict dam-
age upon an entire large tract, while another injures only the property
immediately adjacent-but the land of the defendant which is ini-
tially considered or surveyed to determine the extent of damage is all
property owned by him lying in one contiguous tract, as well as land
intimately connected to it through a unity of use."1 Cross-fencing,
survey lines, and abandoned streets are ignored (though existing and
observed subdivision lines are not). Those tracts which form, as a
practical matter, one contiguous body are eligible for application of
the damage formula to them upon tender of proof of a loss of value.
The practical result of this rule of law leaves to peradventure a large
element of the potential liability of a condemnor. A one-acre strip
:5 308 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
'
9 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3265, 5 1.
so Mitchell v. Texas Electric Service Company, 299 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)
error ref. n.r.e.
"1 Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Goodwine, 228 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949)
error ref. n.r.e.
"sCity of Denton v. Hunt, 235 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.;
Concho, S.S. & L.V. Ry. v. Sanders, 144 S.W. 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
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taken for a gas transmission line right of way through a ten-acre tract
leaves only nine acres to be considered as damaged. If the strip crosses
a 100 acre tract, there are 99 potentially damaged acres remaining,
and in this type of proceeding, the potentialities often come to pass.
